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8.1 Introduction
The reliability of electrical power systems, since their first use, has been
addressed focusing on ensuring the continuous power supply and on the
management of critical situations in order to avoid electrical disruption due
to potential failures. In the last decade, we are witnessing the increasing
development of Smart Grids, with e3.15 billion investment in Smart Grids
projects amongst the EU-28 Member States only in the period 2002–2014 [1].
Smart Grids enhance the classical electrical systems by introducing opti-
mization of grid management, both from transmission and quick reaction to
power disruption through real-time and automated technologies; deploying
and integrating of large-scale renewable energy systems; reducing manage-
ment and power costs, for final users; and introducing and integrating of
smart appliances and consumer devices. While these new aspects make the
electrical systems effective, they become more and more interconnected thus
making them vulnerable to cyber and physical attacks [2–4]. Indeed, it is
possible to remotely perform changes (e.g., to instructions, commands and
configurations), disabling actions, shut down or in general interfere with the
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proper functioning of the system, thus causing in the worst case significant
damages and safety issues [3, 5].
In the Smart Grid domain, security threats can be originated by several
agents: consumers, insiders, and terrorists [3]. Customers could be interested
in falsifying smart meters data in order to steal electrical power. Similarly
to attacks performed to broadband modems, customers may try to attempts
attacks to smart meters aiming at modifying the firmware controlling the
reporting operation, thus decreasing the usage of electricity [3]. Terrorist
attacks to smart grids may lead to unprecedented black-outs, from the point of
view of spatial and time extension [4]. This calls for a fundamental attention
to the identification and management of potential security threats.
This chapter proposes the STECA (STECA – Security Threats, Effects
and Criticality Analysis) approach to perform security assessment of Smart
Grids. The hereby proposed process describes a way in which to identify
vulnerabilities, their related threats, and proposes a risk assessment approach
and a path to identify appropriate countermeasures. This process is based
on the same principles used for the Failure Mode and Effect Analysis
(FMEA)/FMECA process, which is a technique widely used for safety critical
analysis and is highly regarded by the majority of international standards [6].
STECA starts from a vulnerability point of view and moves on towards threat
analysis and criticality assessment. Following the guidelines defined in [7],
the approach is instantiated on a Smart Grid use case, resulting in a set
of precise guidelines and a systematic way to perform security assessment
including vulnerability evaluation and attack impact analysis.
8.2 Motivation
8.2.1 Motivating Concerns in Industry
A fundamental aspect that has to be considered in the implementation of
Smart Grids and that is currently under the stakeholders’ spotlight is related
to the security issues yet to unveil in the overall Smart Grid or at the
connected devices [3, 8], and the consequent impact on safety. Among the
impact situations of a service disruption due to a cyber or physical attack,
property/financial damage and human life hazard should be kept in closer
consideration, as the time for recovering is currently unpredictable.
Previous works on Smart Meters qualification revealed potential security
weakness and exposed some of the equipment vulnerabilities [3]. This can
present a great risk for the future implementation of Smart Grids. It is also
true that, due to the ground-breaking character of this technology and the
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quantity of interfaces that are made available, the security requirements of
the components that will operate in the grid and the grid system itself are not
yet sufficiently accurate (either they are not studied or implemented/tested,
not analysed or imposed yet at a larger scale). This is also strengthened if we
consider these systems general exposure in terms of pervasive interfaces.
In fact, in an informal industrial security assessment of Smart Grid
components, the company CRITICAL Software identified security prob-
lems that are usually disregarded by traditional assessment approaches if
performed without a proper process or tools. Examples of these problems
included: (i) denial of service possibility, (ii) proscribed access to equipment;
(iii) physical security deficiencies; (iv) unintended access to systems para-
meters that should be read-only; and (v) communication protocol implemen-
tation and specification weakness. The experience of CRITICAL Software’s
industrial assessment projects ended up providing most of the incentive
for the development of the STECA process due to the gaps found. First,
CRITICAL Software was providing a security assessment to substantiate a
test framework being developed at the time. Security issues were observed
in the assessed Smart Grid components, both on requirement analysis and
actual component functional tests, despite the work was focused only on a
limited part of the target Smart Grid equipment. In yet another case only
the communications protocols were under test on a preliminary stage. For
instance, it was identified that it is possible without much trouble to generate
conditions that force the interruption of energy supply to a user on the grid.
Either by simulating excessive energy demand or by tampering with billing
contract parameters, it is also possible to provoke a Denial of Service. This
form of service disruption by hacking the metering equipment is a commonly
acknowledged threat, but the impact is largely underestimated. Several other
ways of generating conditions that will switch off the Load Control Switch
can also be identified. It was also clear from the functional testing that
the meter’s communication ports could easily be disabled by setting its
timeout parameter to zero, rendering the equipment incommunicable and thus
impossible to be reconfigured remotely.
Though this experience identified serious security impact scenarios that
justified the need of security assessment, the support available today to
security assessment is limited. There is no history on the components usage
and thus no clear way to understand the attack trends or attacker profiles,
the attacker objectives and the effects of the attacks. It is extremely difficult
to rate the likelihood of a threat, on which to perform a risk or hazard
assessment. Summarizing, there are no real data to work on, which obstacles
the possibility to create a solid base to build a security assessment upon. Also,
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as there is no relevant history of these analyses, it is impossible to even start
by using previous knowledge, checklists, pre-defined lists, etc.
One should also consider the constant struggle that resides in identifying
the vulnerabilities and security threats. On a system of this sort the number
and diversity of security threats could be huge. An undertaking of this
magnitude should inevitably find trouble when aiming to achieve complete-
ness: to claim that all vulnerabilities have been identified and all security
threats analysed will prove to be a nearly impossible task. Even an expert
experience based approach to identify a procedure to tackle this problem is
not a straightforward exercise.
8.2.2 State of the Art and Background
Standards such as [9–11] propose general, high level methodologies to guide
the security assessment of systems. However, standards typically present the
main steps but they do not describe the techniques that can be exploited to
realize these steps. This calls for solutions that, still maintaining compatibility
with the standards, are able to provide an adequate support to the security
engineers. Additionally, several challenges are still open, such as verifying
the completeness of an analysis or compute likelihood and impact of a given
threat.
Several works target techniques for security assessment, also considering
interdependencies between security and safety. The work presented in [12]
proposes an extension of the FMEA safety analysis technique, aiming to ana-
lyse likelihood and impact of cyber-attacks to embedded multicore systems in
the automotive industry. Another contribution, still related to the automotive
domain [13] aims at proposing a novel approach to deal with both safety
hazard and security threat analysis combining the Hazard Analysis and Risk
Assessment with the security STRIDE approach for the automotive battery
management [14] proposes a framework for quantitative security analysis
used to identify potential attack points and paths, thus to recognize those
that are feasible from the perspective of an attacker and finally proposing
meaningful countermeasures to the system. In [7] the authors propose a
general methodology to understand issues’ criticality and the difficulties in
finding a proper solution able to deal with interdependencies between safety
and security. To this purpose, in their work a general security threats library
has been developed, which can be updated over the time and has been
mapped to the NIST security controls [8]. Other contributions evaluating the
effects of security breaches exploits exist as the work in [15], which states a
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comprehensive and practical framework for electric smart grid cyber-attack
impact analysis using graph-theoretic dynamical systems paradigm.
The STECA process presented in this chapter is specifically focused on
Smart Grids. It naturally includes the objective of detecting potential secu-
rity threats and providing efficient mitigations, and it translates the concept
of FMEA to a vulnerability-oriented security assessment where reference
categories are extracted from supporting threat libraries. Additionally, it
guarantees compatibility with main standards [9–11]: in fact, the reference
data to build the threat libraries are extracted from the standard [10], and it
is easy to define a correspondence between the main steps of the STECA
process and the steps of methodologies in [9, 11].
8.3 STECA Process Description
This section presents a detailed description of the STECA process, along with
a running example to illustrate the application of the process to an actual
industry problem related to the main theme of this publication.
8.3.1 The High Level STECA
The hereby proposed process (Figure 8.1) describes a way to identify vul-
nerabilities, their related threats, proposing both a risk assessment approach
Figure 8.1 High level view of the STEC process.
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and a path to identify appropriate countermeasures. Four high-level steps are
identified.
This process is based on the same principles used for the FMEA/FMECA
process [12] which is widely used for safety critical analysis, and is highly
regarded by the majority of international standards. Subsequently, the high
level steps depicted in Figure 8.1 will be described in closer detail.
8.3.2 STECA Inputs
In order to efficiently apply the process several inputs are required and need
to be collected. The input set includes, but is not limited to:
1. The Architecture Diagrams. These, along with the Functional Analysis,
will be used to identify the system’s vulnerabilities.
2. The Interface Control Documents. These will allow a better threat
identification while analysing vulnerabilities.
3. A Functional Analysis. This, along with the Architecture Diagrams, will
be used to identify the system’s vulnerabilities.
4. Other useful input information. Typical security attacks, history data,
system requirements, environment conditions, requirements, etc.
For the running example we’re using the diagram in Figure 8.2 – an energy
industry Smart Grid, focusing on the Smart Meter Home Area Network
(HAN) – the most widespread case of user connected to the Smart Grid,
also a high vulnerability spot as it exposes the metering devices to the internet
through the Consumer HAN.
8.3.3 Security Vulnerabilities
With the STECA inputs we can identify possible intrusion and attack loca-
tions considering the system weak spots listed in Table 8.1. For each of
them, we reported an extended description and the links to the consolidated
ISO/IEC 27005 [6] vulnerability classification which lists the hardware,
network and software vulnerability categories. Additional vulnerability clas-
sifications are the Microsoft Security envelopment Lifecycle (SDL) [16] and
the CWE3 (Common Weakness Enumeration [17]), which is a detailed and
community-developed list of common software weaknesses.
Traditionally, the vulnerability assessment [2, 11] of architectures such as
the one in Figure 8.2 are performed by (i) cataloguing assets and capabilities
(resources) in a system, (ii) assigning quantifiable value (or at least rank
order) and importance to those resources, (iii) identifying the vulnerabilities
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Figure 8.2 Example from the Energy industry showing the architecture of a Smart Grid.
or potential threats to each resource and, (iv) mitigating or eliminating the
most dangerous vulnerabilities for the most valuable resources.
The first three steps are required to be performed in order to obtain
a vulnerability list. Also, by assigning an order (value) to the resource
(vulnerability) we are simplifying the threat severity definition described in
Section 8.3.5.
Each component (system resource) should be classified with a value (as
of an asset) which could simply be a traditional High, Medium or Low grade
according to the associated monetary replacement cost – to be defined by the
system/subsystem owner; and a severity grade based on the impact that its
failure would inflict on the system. To do this, the catalogue depicted later in
Section 8.3.5 is proposed to be used.
Continuing the running example, and focusing on the Communications
Hub (in the Smart Meter HAN) as it is a gateway to the metering devices, and
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Table 8.1 Vulnerabilities, weak spots, and security threats
Vulnerabilities Weak Spots Weak Spots Security Threats
Network CH
communications
protocol
CH
communications
protocol
Message Modification
Man in the middle
Footprinting
Smart Meter access
control
Software CH
communications
protocol
Smart Meter access
control
Smart Meter
functions
Smart Meter access
control
Unauthorized access
Password cracking
Disclosure of
confidential data
Hardware Smart Meter
functions
Smart Meter
functions
Conduct cyber-physical
attacks on
organizational facilities
Arbitrary code
execution
the electricity Smart Meter itself, as it is a big concern in the motivation, we
obtain the following:
• Communication Hub: Value: Low; Severity: Minor;
• Electricity Smart Meter: Value Low; Severity: Critical/Catastrophic.
8.3.4 Threats Map
In this step of the process the security threats shall be identified and
catalogued by performing the following sub-steps:
• Identify the threats for each vulnerability. Following the list produced in
the previous step, we list the threats that may exploit each vulnerability.
This operation will produce a list of threats per vulnerability.
• Catalogue Threats (NIST classes). Identified threats will most likely be
found in the known threats list, thus having associated countermeasures.
Most possibly, the gathered threats have already been identified in differ-
ent contexts and catalogued in a generic fashion in existing documents,
thus a set of countermeasures and preventive actions might already be
available. For this purpose, already existing classification taxonomy may
be used. For this process we’re using the threat library already created in
[7], which will help to catalogue the threats to the NIST classes and the
suggested countermeasures.
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• Threat Classification Completeness Check. If unlisted threats arise,
countermeasures should be suggested to mitigate them and the threat
library should be complemented by adding this new information to the
respective taxonomy class.
Next in the running example, the weak spots are identified and respective
Vulnerability categories. Some examples are reported in Table 8.2.
Following through with the running example and mapping these threats
to the Threat Library it is possible to catalogue almost all of them to the NIST
classes and gather the respective countermeasures to mitigate them. The NIST
7628 [9] states, in more than one occasion, that its focus is cyber-security and
therefore “The requirements related to emergency lighting, fire protection,
temperature and humidity controls, water damage, power equipment and
power cabling, and lockout/tag-out are important requirements for safety.
These are outside the scope of cyber security and are not included in this
report. However, these requirements must be addressed by each organization
Table 8.2 Linking weak spots and ISO/IEC 27005 vulnerability categories
Weak Spots Description
ISO/IEC 27005
[6] Categories Threat Example
Component
interfaces,
communica-
tions ports/
protocols
These are usually the
targets to corrupt
communications
either to attain
disruption or
impersonating
another party.
Network
Software
Man in the middle packet
sniffing conducted between
the smart meter and the
Energy Management
Gateway
Inject malicious code into
the USB device controller
(BadUSB, [18])
Memory and
Storage Units
These may be used to
store malicious code
for later execution or
even altered firmware
when system
reconfiguration is
required.
Software
Hardware
Installation of a malware
which damages user data or
key memory areas
Damaging the Hard Drives
(i.e., putting a magnetic
source near the storage rack
servers)
Processing
Units
These, of course, may
be used to execute the
malicious code.
Software Inserting malicious code
that calls for ALU
operations slow downing
the whole execution
Hardware Malicious hardware module
targeting the performance
of the cache accesses or
generating power faults
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in accordance with local, state, federal, and organizational regulations, poli-
cies, and procedures.” In this example, the “Conduct cyber-physical attacks
on organizational facilities” threat could be the example stated in the motiva-
tion section where an Electricity Smart Meter is rendered inoperative and
incommunicable, inducing a denial of service occurrence with potentially
catastrophic impact, and will be the focus of the running example in the
following sections.
8.3.5 Risk Assessment and Attack Severity
For this step, similar to the Cause and Effects analysis, there are two things
that need to be accounted for when considering each threat event: probability
and impact.
Probability: (Attack Profit – Motivation). In several contexts the param-
eters used to calculate the probability of an attack are based on a likelihood
extracted from existing data. In general, there are no “reasonable” approaches
to compute the likelihood of an attack, apart using past history, meaning that
this specific approach is applicable only for few systems. As in this case there
is no such data, we propose to use the estimated benefit that the attacker
may obtain due to a successful attack. This can be seen as a combination of
(i) Cost: availability of resources to perform the attack (time, money, state of
the art hardware), (ii) Risk of detection (to what extent can the attacker hide
his actions and how much does he care about being detected) and (iii) Payoff
(the benefit that an attacker expects from exploiting a vulnerability). These
three components can be considered separately or grouped together to build
a unique likelihood score that can be obtained depending on the specific
needs. One possible likelihood example could be an index that represents
the cost/benefit trade-off, calculated as the fraction of Payoff over Cost but,
for this purpose, we propose a form of calculation using the three variables
as shown in Figure 8.3.
Having the lowest values on the origin (0,0,0) and increasing each vari-
able in each of the respective axis. Colour code (green, yellow and red)
represents the likelihood of an attack as depicted (unlikely, moderate and
likely, respectively).
The Attack Probability assigned values are just an example and, when
applied, should be adapted to the respective domain requirements. If it is
considered that a system exposure to attack is less dependent on payoff than
the other variables, more red and yellow dots should be reflected on the
graph.
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Figure 8.3 Attack probability graph.
Impact: (Attack Damage). The extent to which an attack may cause
damage. This should include all harmful consequences. It may be calculated
based on the individual resources involved (associated value and severity),
the effects produced by a general failure of the resources involved and the
derivate pernicious effects from the aftermath. The worst case scenario should
be considered for the Impact calculation.
The Risk of a given Threat Event used in this case is based on a traditional
Criticality approach. The values used in this example have a higher weight on
the Impact rather than the Probability.
The values in Figure 8.4 were calculated by multiplying the grades
assigned to the respective probability and impact ranks. A green code was
assigned to values lesser than or equal to 3, yellow to values between 4
and 9 inclusive and red to values greater than or equal to 10. Again, this
is an illustrative example and the colour code should be adapted to the
Figure 8.4 Threat Event Risk Matrix.
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Figure 8.5 Description of impact categories.
domain requirements. Higher a criticality is inherent the intervals should slide
accordingly.
As for the Severity categories, the consequences were gathered from the
NIST Threat Events Impact Assessment Scale but, once again, they should be
dependent on the domain requirements. Discrimination goes as in Figure 8.5.
Picking up the running example, to assess a likelihood value for the
“Conduct cyber-physical attacks . . . ” threat by using the suggested process,
we would come out with the following result: Cost: low, Risk: Medium,
Payoff: Medium/High.
In the case of the Payoff the assigned grade may depend on the objective
of attacker. If the objective is the actual denial of service, the Payoff could be
considered High – the worst case scenario. This would produce a Probability
result of Moderate to Likely (2 or 3 in Figure 8.5). Moving to the Threat
Event Risk calculation, and considering the Smart Meter asset severity grade
of Critical/Catastrophic (4 or 5 in Figure 8.5), the result would come out in
the range of 8 to 15 (mostly Red).
8.3.6 STECA Recommendations
After all vulnerabilities and respective threats are considered and analysed,
countermeasures and preventive actions should be suggested for each of them.
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Either from the existing documentation and standards and the educated analy-
sis performed where the vulnerabilities are yet to be acknowledged. Counter-
measures should be suggested according to their respective mitigation type,
as in:
• Vulnerability: the optimal option if possible. If a vulnerability may be
avoided all the associated threats will be cleared.
• Threat Event: if a treat event may be prevented, the associated security
threat will be cleared.
• Threat probability/impact: If it is impossible to avoid a threat, con-
sideration should be given to reducing its impact. By downsizing the
probability and/or the impact its risk will be downgraded making the
system a bit safer. The priority will be set according to the domain and/or
system requirements.
The countermeasures are not mutually exclusive and more than one might be
applied for each threat. There are, of course, a number of considerations while
selecting from the available options, most typically the trade-off between
the countermeasure implementation costs vs. its effective security improve-
ment. For a better evaluation in this regard, further iterations of the process
including the countermeasures implementations should be performed.
To aid and formalize the process of the security threats analysis, a
STECA report depicted in Figure 8.6 should be produced based on the
proposed template. For each security threat one of these entries should be
included (the fields should be self-explanatory once one is acquainted with the
process):
Figure 8.6 STECA report example.
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1: STECA ID – Unique identifier of a security threat;
2: Architecture Diagram/Model – Relevant Model and/or Diagram files for
the process;
3: Domain – Domain to which the process will adapt (Space, Automotive,
Railway, Energy. . . );
4: Weak Spot (Vulnerability) – A mark on the Diagram/Model to signal a
weak spot on a component (as in Table 8.1);
5: Vulnerability (ISO/IEC 27005 connected categories);
6: Security Threats – Threat on a vulnerable component (weak spot);
7: Threat Library Mapping – Respective threat in the Threat Library;
8: NIST Proposed Countermeasures – Countermeasure info from the
Threat Library;
9: Countermeasure Effectiveness – Applicability of the Threat Library
proposed countermeasure to this specific security threat;
10: Attack probability – Calculated as described in Section 8.3.5;
11: Impact Severity – Calculated as described in Section 8.3.5;
12: Treat Event Risk – Calculated as described in Section 8.3.5;
13: Alternative Countermeasures – Countermeasure suggestion if none are
available or are considered ineffective;
14: Recommendations – Further considerations to be kept in mind;
15: Assumptions – Assumptions to security threat or regarding information
if any;
Notes: Any additional information that might be relevant and does not fit any
of the previous.
Note that some of the columns in Figure 8.6 are hidden considering only
the most relevant ones for the example. After the report is concluded, meaning
all the threats in all the weak spots are analysed and addressed, the STECA
process iteration is finished.
To conclude the running example, and as far as countermeasures are
concerned (apart from the ones suggested by the Threat Library as shown
in Figure 8.6), the suggestions could be something along the lines of the
physical countermeasures referred in Section 8.2, filling in the gap in the
Threat Library:
• Dumb Meter Bypass
• Smart Meter Black Box
Even if cyber security issues are addressed by threat and risk assessment
processes, the STECA can help to identify unaddressed high impact security
issues, and support a security/safety report to deliver to the proper authorities.
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Based on the STECA results new security requirements may be derived or the
existing ones may be improved; those new/updated requirements will lead to
improvements in the system safety architecture and design.
8.4 Conclusion
In this chapter, we presented the STECA (Security Threats Effects and Criti-
cality Analysis) process to help formalizing the security analysis of complex
systems such as Smart Grids. The necessity of devising STECA stems from
the direct experience of engineers working in the security assessment of the
Smart Grid domain. The proposed process is established on a similar mature
technique used for safety critical systems for decades (FMEA/FMECA) and
maps to the well-known NIST taxonomy for the security vulnerabilities and
threats analysis. We demonstrated that STECA application is straightforward
and useful for security assessment.
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